January 12, 2026
Venezuela’s leader may be gone, but his regime remains – with a new chief in Washington
The interim president, Delcy Rodríguez, is consolidating her power and has signalled a willingness to work with the Trump administration.
US President Donald Trump has insisted the United States will now be “running” Venezuela after US forces bombed the capital on January 3 and whisked Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife to face federal charges in New York.
Trump has that “large US oil companies” would be going into Venezuela to “start making money”. And in passing, he has also that with Maduro gone, Venezuelans “are free” and the country is already becoming “” again.
But autocratic regimes do not depend on their leaders alone. They get their strength from the vast bureaucracies and security apparatuses under the leader and the complicity of individuals down the chain of command.
These structures have been shaken in Venezuela, but not dismantled. Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s loyal vice president, has assumed the presidency and the powerful interior minister (Diosdado Cabello) and defence minister (Vladimir Padrino) – the “men with the guns” – .
So, rather than bringing regime change, Trump is now propping up the Maduro regime from Washington.
The rise and decline of chavismo
Venezuela has been dominated by two leaders for the last nearly 30 years – Hugo Chávez (president from 1999–2013) and Maduro (2013–26).
After his election on a left-wing, populist platform, Chávez launched sweeping social programs inspired by the Venezuelan military officer Simón Bolívar, who is revered in much of Latin America for leading several countries to independence from Spain in the 19th century.
Chávez’s moves to lead a second “” created a new ideology in Venezuela known as chavismo that aimed to build a and fight against what Chávez called the new US imperialism taking hold in the region.
After Maduro took power on Chávez’s death, chavismo was slowly replaced with a new ideology centred on Maduro’s increasingly authoritarian rule, known as madurismo.
Chávez’s previous confrontations with the US lost their ideological power. During Maduro’s reign, the US imposed that crippled the Venezuelan economy. However, Chevron, a US oil and gas company, , signalling the Maduro government’s pragmatic transformation.
And unlike the charismatic Chávez, Maduro’s legitimacy eventually began to suffer. After the contested 2024 presidential election, Maduro , but and pointed to fraud.
The regime became increasingly isolated internationally – an easy target for Trump’s campaign to dislodge Maduro from power.
Maduro’s isolation, however, did not mean madurismo had magically disappeared. What frayed under Maduro was the movement’s ideological basis. What hardened was its governing system. As and Maduro’s electoral support narrowed, the regime shifted away from mobilising the public in the same way Chavez did. It instead focused on institutional survival.
This survival led to a heavily and tight chains of command. The regime also deepened its patronage networks within the main political party, the (PSUV), and extended its and . were tolerated or employed when useful.
These institutional apparatuses do not vanish when a leader loses legitimacy. They can be rebranded quickly. That is why the machinery remained strong when Trump removed Maduro. It is also why it could be handed over to Delcy Rodríguez.
New leader, same system
Rodríguez’s rise to power suggests a third mutation of chavismo is now underway.
As sociologist Rafael Uzcátegui , Rodríguez is dropping the movement’s defining confrontation with the United States to survive, now with Washington’s blessing.
Hours after Maduro’s abduction, a pre-signed decree by the president . It authorised members of the military and police to “search and capture” anyone accused of promoting or supporting the US attack on Venezuela. The emergency declaration extends to the and its 200,000 or so members, who have been placed under the military chain of command.
The state of emergency, therefore, strengthens Rodríguez’s capacity to deliver what Washington wants because it consolidates coercive control at home.
Then, on January 5, Rodríguez was after Venezuela’s Supreme Court deemed Maduro to be in “” from the country. Yet, requires elections within 30 days if there is an “absolute absence” of the president.
By the regime’s own legal terms, a democratic transition was available. Instead, continuity has been secured.
Rodríguez has been installed on the basis of a “temporary absence” for 90 days, extendable by the National Assembly for another 90 days. Then, the assembly may decide there is an “absolute absence” of Maduro and call for elections. Rodríguez has a powerful hold over the assembly, which is led by her brother, Jorge Rodríguez.
Trump to have elections because the interim government is giving the US “everything that we feel is necessary”. He has also as lacking the “respect” and “support” to be a future leader of the country.
Meanwhile, Rodríguez is consolidating power. In the first cabinet meeting, she was with the regime’s two main strongmen, Padrino and Cabello, at her side. She has also begun to shape the regime to her liking.
She ordered General to assume command of the presidential guard and appointed as vice president for the economy.
Both posts are sensitive: the first will oversee her personal security; the second will negotiate the distribution of Venezuela’s oil wealth with the Americans.
A new chavista-in-chief
Trump’s orders are now being implemented in what many critics are now calling his .
A few political prisoners have been in what has been seen as a goodwill gesture. The core US interest, however, is oil. Trump has said will be handed over to the US. Exclusive will be signed. The ground is prepared for the , destined to function as the office of a proconsul (an administrator of a colony or occupied territory).
This is not a democratic transition. It is chavismo in a new form: power without Chávez’s anti-imperialist rhetoric, without promises, and without a people.
, Senior Lecturer in Human Rights, Constitutional Law and Legal Theory,
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